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On Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley
Matching Algorithm
Yannai A. Gonczarowski ∗and Ehud Friedgut †
Abstract
Lying in order to manipulate the Gale-Shapley matching algo-
rithm has been studied in [2] and [3] and was shown to be generally
more appealing to the proposed-to side (denoted as the women in
[1]) than to the proposing side (denoted as men there). It can also
be shown that in the case of lying women, for every woman who is
better-off due to lying, there exists a man who is worse-off.
In this paper, we show that an even stronger dichotomy between
the goals of the sexes holds, namely, if no woman is worse-off then no
man is better-off, while a form of sisterhood between the lying and
the “innocent” women also holds, namely, if none of the former are
worse-off, then neither is any of the latter.
This paper is based upon an undergraduate (“Amirim”) thesis of
the first author.
1 Background
1.1 The Gale-Shapley Algorithm
In order to standardize the notation used throughout this article, and for
sake of self-containment, let us quickly recap the scenario introduced in
[1] and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm introduced there:
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Let W and M be equally-sized finite sets of women and men, respec-
tively. Let each member of these sets have a strict order of preference re-
garding the members of the set this member does not belong to.
Definition 1.1. A one-to-one map betweenW and M is called a matching.
Definition 1.2. A matching is called unstable under the given orders of prefer-
ence if there exist two matched couples (w,m) and (w˜, m˜) such that w prefers m˜
overm and m˜ prefersw over w˜. A matching which is not unstable is called stable.
Theorem 1.3 ([1]). The following algorithm stops and yields a stable matching
betweenW andM (in particular, such a matching exists), and no stable matching
is better for any man m ∈ M : The algorithm is divided into steps, to which we
shall refer as “nights”. On each night, each man serenades under the window
of the woman he prefers most among all women who have not (yet) rejected him,
and then each woman, under whose window more than one man serenades, rejects
every man who serenades under her window, except for the man she prefers most
among these men. The algorithm stops on a night on which no man is rejected by
any woman, and then each woman is matched with whoever has serenaded under
her window on this night.
Generalizations to this algorithm which include different sizes for W
andM , preference lists which do not include all the members of the oppo-
site sex (“blacklisting”), and one-to-many matchings, are also presented in
[1] and will be discussed in section 3.
1.2 Previous Results
As quoted above, the stable matching given by the Gale-Shapley algorithm
is optimal (out of all stable matchings) for each man. A somewhat reverse
claim holds regarding the women:
Theorem 1.4 ([6], derived from a more general theorem by Knuth). No
stable matching is worse for any woman w ∈ W than the matching given by the
Gale-Shapley algorithm.
The benefits of the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm for the men have
been demonstrated even further in [2], where it was shown that no man
can get a better match by lying about his preferences (i.e., manipulate the
algorithm by declaring a false order of preference, assuming the algorithm
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is run according to the “true” preferences of all women and all other men)
and that no subset of the men can all get better matches by lying in a
coordinated fashion.
These observations lead to the analysis of the profitability of lying by
women in [3], where it is proven that if more that one stable matching
exists, then at least one woman can get a better match by lying about her
preferences.
It is easy to show that any woman who is better off as a result of some-
one’s lie (whoever that liar or those liars may be and whatever their lie
may be) is matched (due to the lie) to someone who is now worse off. (In-
deed, if they are both better off, then the original match can not be stable.)
In other words, for every woman who is better-off, some man is worse-off.
As mentioned above, in the next section we will show that an even
stronger dichotomy between the goals of the sexes holds, while a form of
sisterhood between the lying and the “innocent” women also holds.
2 Monogamous Matchings
2.1 The Theorem
LetW andM be equally-sized finite sets of women and men, respectively.
Let each member of these sets be endowedwith a strict order of preference
regarding the members of the other set. These will be referred to as “the
true preferences”, the application of the Gale-Shapley algorithm according
to these preferences will be referred to as OA (original algorithm), and
resulting matching will be referred to as “the original matching”.
Assume that a subset of the women, denoted L (for liars) declare false
orders of preference for themselves. Call the application of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm according to these false preferences for the members of L, and
according to the real preferences of othermembers ofW (referred to, hence-
forth, as innocent) and of all the members of M , NA , and the resulting
matching — “the new matching”.
Definition 2.1. A person p ∈ W∪M is said to be “better-off” (resp. “worse-off”)
if p prefers, according to their true order of preference, their match according to
the new matching (resp. the original matching) over their match according to the
original matching (resp. the new matching).
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Let us now phrase our main result for the above conditions.
Theorem 2.2. Under the above conditions, if no lying woman is worse-off, then:
(a) No woman is worse-off.
(b) No man is better-off.
2.2 Proofs for a Special Case
Definition 2.3. A woman l ∈ L is said to be lying in a personally-optimal way
if, all other orders of preference being the same, there is no other false order of
preference she can declare which will result in her being even better-off, i.e. her
being matched with a man she (truly) prefers over the man matched to her by the
new matching.
Theorem 2.2 is easily provable in the special case that all women in L lie
in a personally-optimal way, as it is possible to show that in this case, the
new matching is stable under the true preferences, and thus, no woman
is worse-off, and no man is better-off, than under the original matching.
Nonetheless, it will be shown below that in some cases, when liars may
coordinate their lies, it is logical to lie in a non-personally-optimal way,
and that in these cases the resulting matching might be unstable under the
true preferences.
It can be noted that if we examine a “lying game” between the member
of L, where a player’s strategy is a declaration of a specific order of pref-
erence for theirself, and the utility for each player is determined by the
position of her new match on their true preference list, then in this game,
the conditions of the special case described above are met if and only if the
set of lies constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Roth (private communication, Dec. 2007) suggested the following sketch
of a proof to part a of Theorem 2.2:
• If women can do better than to state their true preferences, they can
do so by truncating their preferences.
• Truncating preferences is the opposite of extending preferences (as
discussed in [6] in the context of adding new players)
• When anywoman extends her preferences, it harms the other women.
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(As already noted, truncating preference lists is discussed in section 3
below.) While this also proves Theorem 2.2 in the special case discussed
above (in which all women lie in a personally-optimal way), it appears not
to prove Theorem 2.2 itself (i.e., with no additional assumptions), as while
it is true that if a woman can do better than to state her true preferences
then she can do better by truncating them (and even more so, there always
exists a truncation of her true preferences which constitutes a personally-
optimal lie for her), it turns out that there may exist some man whom she
can secure for herself by submitting false preferences, but not by truncat-
ing her true preferences. This will be illustrated by an example below.
2.3 When a Lie Needs Not be Optimal
As was shown in section 2.2, Theorem 2.2 is easily provable if each lying
woman lies in a personally-optimal way, or if the new matching is stable
under everyone’s true preferences.
Before continuing to the main proof, let us give an example of a sce-
nario with the following properties:
1. No woman can do better by lying alone (while all others tell the
truth).
2. In every conspiracy by more than one woman to lie so that none of
them are worse-off and at least one is better-off, there exists a woman
who does not lie in a personally-optimal way. In other words, it is
logical to lie in a non-optimal way.
3. The resulting matching is not stable under the true preferences and
can not be achieved by simply truncating women’s true preference
lists (even if that is allowed).
This example includes four women (w1, ..., w4) and fourmen (m1, ..., m4).
The orders of preference for the women fulfill:
• w1: First choice: m3, second choice: m1.
• w2: First choice: m3, second choice: m1.
• w3: Prefersm2 over m1 and prefers m1 over m3.
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• w4: Any order of preference.
The orders of preference for the men fulfill:
Man 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 4th choice
m1 w1 w3 w2 w4
m2 w2 w3 any any
m3 w3 w2 w1 w4
m4 w1 w4 any any
Let us examine OA :
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
Night
Window
w1 w2 w3 w4
1 m4, m1 m2 m3
2 m1 m2 m3 m4
It is clear from this examination that any conspiring subset of thewomen
wishing to make a difference (in the scenario which does not allow trun-
cating preference lists) has to include w1. Also, it can be verified that w1
can not lie alone (while all others tell the truth) and become better-off. In-
deed, in order to become better-off, w1 has to be matched, under the new
matching, with m3, and since he prefers w2 over her, this entails his rejec-
tion by w2, but since he is the first choice of w2, this means w2 has to lie and
declare that she prefers another man over him. Let us assume, then, that
L = {w1, w2}. (It can be verified that the result would not change even if
we admit more women to L.)
It can easily be verified that, given the true orders of preference for ev-
eryone except w1 and w2, there exists exactly one combination of false or-
ders of preference for these two women (up to changes in their preferences
regarding men who will not reach their windows as long as everyone else
tells the truth) which will cause them both to be better-off:
• w1 must declare she prefers m3 over m4 andm4 over m1.
• w2 must declare she prefers m1 over m3 andm3 over m2.
Let us examine NA under these false orders of preference:
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❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
Night
Window
w1 w2 w3 w4
1 m4, m1 m2 m3
2 m4 m2 m1, m3
3 m4 m2, m3 m1
4 m4 m3 m1, m2
5 m4 m1, m3 m2
6 m3, m4 m1 m2
7 m3 m1 m2 m4
Indeed, w1 and w2 are both better-off (and, as Theorem 2.2 states, no
other woman is worse-off, and the even innocent w3 is better-off as well)
however this lie is clearly not personally-optimal for w2, since she can de-
clare any order of preference under which her first choice is m3, and be-
come even better-off by being matched with him, but if she tries to do that
(either by telling the truth, or by lying), then w1 becomes worse-off and
in this case it is better for w1 to tell the truth which, as stated earlier, will
cause the newmatching to be identical to the old matching, and hence will
cause w2 to be matched with m2, ending up in a worse situation than had
she lied the above-described non-personally-optimal lie.
In the above-described lying game between w1 and w2, the utility for
each of the players given these strategies is higher than her utility in any
Nash equilibrium, and this is the only pair of strategies (up to the degrees
of freedom discussed above) with this property.
It should be noted that the resulting new matching is neither stable
under the original preferences (as w2 and m3 truly prefer each other over
their respective matches) nor can it be achieved by simply truncating the
preference lists of w1 and w2 (as any such truncation will result in w2 either
having a blank list or a list withm3 as her first choice), giving, as promised,
an example where the above proofs do not hold.
2.4 A General Proof
Before proving the general case of Theorem 2.2, let us first introduce a few
notations: For each person p ∈ W ∪ M , let us denote the person from
the opposite sex matched with p under the original matching (resp. new
matching) with O(p) (resp. N(p)).
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Definition 2.4. A woman w ∈ W is said to be a rejecter if she rejected N(w)
during OA . In this case, let the man who serenaded under her window on the
night of OA on which she rejected N(w), but whom she did not reject on that
night (and whom, therefore, she prefers over N(w)), be denoted B(w).
Lemma 2.5. If a man m ∈ M never serenaded under the window of a woman
w ∈ W during NA (resp. OA ), thenm prefersN(m) (resp. O(m)) over w.
Proof. Since m approaches women according to his own order of prefer-
ence, and since he never reached w’s window during NA (resp. OA ), then
he must have ended up being matched, under the new (resp. old) match-
ing, to a woman he prefers over w, and by definition, that woman is N(m)
(resp. O(m)).
By the following Lemma, we need only prove part b of Theorem 2.2.
Lemma 2.6. If a woman w ∈ W is worse-off, then O(w) is better-off.
Proof. Since w is worse-off, w prefers O(w) over N(w) according to her
true order of preference. Since it is given that no liar is worse-off, then w
is not a liar, and therefore she declared that she prefers O(w) over N(w)
also during NA . Therefore, since w prefers N(w) over any other man
who serenaded under her window during NA , it follows that O(w) could
not have serenaded under her window on any night during NA . Thus,
by Lemma 2.5, O(w) prefers N(O(w)) over w = O(O(w)), making O(w)
better-off.
Lemma 2.7. If a manm ∈ M is better-off, then N(m) is a rejecter.
Proof. Sincem is better-off, m prefers O(m) over N(m). Therefore, sincem
approaches women according to his own order of preference,mwould not
serenade underO(m)’s window before first having been rejected byN(m).
Now, sincem serenades underO(m)’s window during the last night ofOA
, it follows that he must have been rejected by N(m) on some earlier night
during OA . Since N(m) rejected m = N(N(m)) during OA , then she is a
rejecter.
Lemma 2.8. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then she is worse-off.
Proof. By induction and transitivity, w prefers O(w) over any man she re-
jected during OA and therefore, being a rejecter, over N(w), and is thus
worse-off.
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Lemma 2.9. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then B(w) prefers N(B(w)) over
w.
Proof. By Lemma 2.8, w is not a liar, and as such, her order of preference
during NA is her true order of preference. Since w is a rejecter, w prefers
B(w) over N(w). Therefore, as w truly prefers N(w) over any other man
who serenaded under her window during NA , it follows that B(w) could
not have serenaded under w’s window during NA . Thus, by Lemma 2.5,
B(w) prefers N(B(w)) over w.
Lemma 2.10. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then
1. N(B(w)) is a rejecter.
2. During OA , w rejected N(w) on a strictly later night than the night on
whichN(B(w)) rejected B(w).
Proof. Throughout this proof, for the sake of conciseness, wherever we
discuss whether a rejection or serenading occurred, or when it occurred,
we always refer to OA . Since w is a rejecter, then according to Lemma 2.9,
B(w) prefers N(B(w)) over w. Also note that by definition of B(w), B(w)
serenaded under w’s window on some night. By these two observations,
and since B(w) approaches women according to his own order of prefer-
ence, N(B(w)) rejected B(w), and did so on a night strictly earlier than
any night on which B(w) serenaded under w’s window. Since N(B(w))
rejected B(w) = N(N(B(w))), then she is a rejecter. Moreover, since, by
definition of B(w), w rejected N(w) on a night on which B(w) serenaded
under her window as well, then this night is a strictly later night than the
night on which N(B(w)) rejected B(w).
To complete the proof of Theorem 2.2, assume for contradiction that
there exists a better-off man m ∈ M . Let us denote w1 = N(m), and by
Lemma 2.7, she is a rejecter. Now, for each i ∈ N, assume by induction
that wi is a rejecter and set wi+1 = N(B(wi)). By Lemma 2.10, wi+1 is a
rejecter. Moreover, by that lemma, duringOA , wi rejectedN(wi) on a night
strictly later than the night onwhich wi+1 rejectedB(wi) = N(N(B(wi))) =
N(wi+1).
From finiteness of W , there must exist i < j such that wi = wj , but by
induction, since i < j, then duringOA , wi rejectedN(wi) on a night strictly
later than the night on which wj rejected N(wj)— a contradiction.
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Corollary 2.11. Under the conditions of Theorem 2.2, every better-off woman, is
matched to a worse-off man.
3 Generalizations
3.1 Polygamous Matchings
In [1], a one-to-many version of the algorithm was specified and proposed
as a way to assign students to colleges (on each algorithm-step, the stu-
dents apply to their favorite not-yet-rejected-by college, and then each
college rejects all applicants except for the most preferred ones, accord-
ing to the quota of this college) and proved that the resulting matching is
stable and that it is optimal (within all stable matches) for each applicant.
It can also be shown that it is the worst (within all stable matches) for each
college.
In [4], it was made public that the assignment of medical interns to
hospitals in the USA has been done using a similar algorithm since 1951,
however, in this algorithm the roles were switched and the hospitals were
the ’proposers’ and the resulting matching is optimal (within all stable
matches) for each hospital and worst for each intern.
In this subsection, we will prove a generalization of Theorem 2.2 for
these scenarios. In order to ease the transition from the previous section,
we will maintain the notation of women and men, and refer to the above
scenarios as “the polygamous scenarios”. Let us redefine our notation for
these scenarios:
Let W and M be finite lists of women and men, respectively, and let
each person be endowed, as before, with a strict order of preference with
regards to the members of the opposite sex. For each person p ∈ W ∪
M , define np to be the “quota” of this person, i.e., the amount of spouses
from the opposite sex this person seeks. As our goal is the generalization
of both algorithms described above, the reader may assume, for ease of
readability, that either all women are monogamous (∀w ∈ W : nw = 1)
or all men are monogamous (∀m ∈ M : nm = 1), however the rest of this
paper holds verbatim even if this is not the case. (If both the women and
men aremonogamous we are reduced to the scenario given in the previous
section.) We will also assume for now that
∑
w∈W nw =
∑
m∈M nm. (This
guarantees that when the algorithm stops, each person p is matched with
10
exactly np people of the opposite sex — this reduces in the monogamous
case toW andM being of identical size.)
Definition 3.1. A map between W and M, mapping each p ∈ W ∪M to exactly
np members of the set p does not belong to, is called a matching.
The definition of instability of amatching requires another detail which
was inferred from the other requirements in the monogamous scenario:
Definition 3.2. A matching is called unstable under the given orders of prefer-
ence if there exist two matched couples (w,m) and (w˜, m˜) such that:
1. w is not matched with m˜.
2. w prefers m˜ overm.
3. m˜ prefers w over w˜.
As before, a matching which is not unstable is called stable.
On each night of the polygamous algorithm, each man m ∈ M sere-
nades under the windows of nm women that he prefers the most out of all
women who have not (yet) rejected him, and then each woman w ∈ W ,
under whose window more than nw men serenade, rejects every man who
serenaded under her window, except for the nw men she prefers most
among them.
Now, as before, assume that a subset of the women, denoted L, declare
false orders of preference for themselves.
For a person p ∈ P , Let us denote the set of people of the opposite
sex matched with this person under the original matching (resp. the new
matching) with O(p) = {op1, ..., o
p
np
} (resp. N(p) = {np1, ..., n
p
np
}) such that p
prefers opi over o
p
i+1 (resp. prefers n
p
i over n
p
i+1).
Before we phrase the polygamous version of Theorem 2.2, we have
to redefine the circumstances under which a person is said to be better-,
or worse-off. It should be noted that while in the monogamous scenario
each person’s order of preference yields a full order on the set of possible
matches for that person (i.e., people of the opposite sex), in the polyga-
mous case each person’s order of preference yields a partial order on the
set of possible matches for that person (i.e., np-tuples of people of the op-
posite sex). This introduces an asymmetry between the following two def-
initions, which did not exist in the monogamous scenario.
11
Definition 3.3. A woman w ∈ W is said to be weakly better-off if for each 1 ≤
i ≤ nw, w does not prefer o
w
i over n
w
i .
Definition 3.4. A man m ∈ M is said to have gained only worse matches if he
prefers each member of O(w) over each member of N(w) \ O(w). (Note that this
condition is met in the special case in which N(w) = O(w).)
Theorem 3.5. Under the above conditions, if all lying women are weakly better-
off, then:
(a) All women are weakly better-off.
(b) All men have gained only worse matches.
The special case of Theorem 3.5 in which all women are polygamous
and men are monogamous can be easily proven by reduction to the con-
ditions of Theorem 2.2 by “replicating” each polygamous woman w ∈ W
into nw monogamous women {(w, i)}
nw
i=1, each having the same order of
preference as w. For each man m ∈ M , replace w on his list of preferences
with these women, in such a way that he prefers (w, i) over (w, i + 1) for
all i. A reduction along these lines was used in [2] to generalize certain
properties of the monogamous scenario to the polygamous-women sce-
nario and it was shown there that the men matched with (w, 1), ..., (w, nw)
by the monogamous algorithm are exactly those matched with w by the
polygamous algorithm. Furthermore, in the notations of this paper, it can
be shown that the man matched with (w, i) by OA is owi and by NA is n
w
i ,
thus completing the reduction since this yields that w is weakly better-off
if and only if none of the monogamous women (w, i) is worse-off, and
since it is clear that as all men are monogamous, if a man is not better-off
under the reduction, then he has only gained worse matches before the
reduction.
Unfortunately, “replicating” each man in a similar same way will not
yield a proof for even the monogamous women - polygamous men sce-
nario as easily, for it is possible for a woman w to be weakly better-off be-
fore the reduction by maintaining the same match m, but to be worse-off
under the reduction because hermatch is e.g. (m, 2) instead of (m, 1). Also,
every replicated monogamous man not being better-off under the reduc-
tion does not necessarily imply that every polygamous man has gained
only worse matches before the reduction. To make things even worse, in
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the general case where both men and women may be polygamous, run-
ning the monogamous algorithm after such a “replication” does not even
produce the same matching as would be produced by the polygamous
algorithm, as it may lead to situations such as a couple matched to each
other with multiplicity greater than 1.
Indeed, in order to prove Theorem 3.5 in its general form we have to
retrace our steps and revisit the inner workings of the proof of Theorem
2.2, rewriting it to accommodate for the generalizations we introduced.
We will now redefine some of the definitions used in that proof, and then
give its generalized form.
Definition 3.6. A woman w ∈ W is said to be a rejecter if she rejected any of the
members of N(w) during OA . Let us denote the set of all such rejected members
R(w).
Definition 3.7. A man m ∈ M is said to be a rejectee if there exists a rejecter
w ∈ N(m) such thatm ∈ R(w). Similarly to the proof of Theorem 2.2, a key role
will be played by a man B(w,m) for which, in a sense,m was rejected. The exact
definition of this man will appear in Lemma 3.11.
As before, we will begin with a Lemma by which we need only prove
part b of Theorem 3.5.
Lemma 3.8. If a woman w ∈ W is not weakly better-off, then there exists m ∈
O(w) who has not gained only worse matches.
Proof. Since it is given that all liars are weakly better-off, if follows that w
is not a liar, and therefore her order of preference during NA is her true
order of preference. Since w is not weakly better-off, there exists 1 ≤ i ≤
nw such that w prefers o
w
i over n
w
i and thus prefers o
w
1 , ..., o
w
i over n
w
i . By
induction and by the definition of the polygamous algorithm, there are
exactly i − 1 men who serenaded under w’s window during NA and that
she (truly) prefers over nwi (these are n
w
1 , ..., n
w
i−1), so by the pigeonhole
principle, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ i such that owj did not serenade under w’s
window during NA . Therefore, since owj approaches women according to
his own order of preference, owj prefers all women in N(o
w
j ) over w. Since
|N(owj )| = nowj = |O(o
w
j )|, and since w ∈ O(o
w
j ) \N(o
w
j ), it follows that there
exists w˜ ∈ N(owj )\O(o
w
j ) and as stated, o
w
j prefers her over w and hence (as
w ∈ O(owj )) o
w
j has not gained only worse matches.
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Lemma 3.9. If a man m ∈ M has not gained only worse matches, then he is a
rejectee.
Proof. Since m has not gained only worse matches, there there exist w ∈
O(m) and w˜ ∈ N(m)\O(m) such thatm prefers w˜ over w. Since w ∈ O(m),
it follows that m serenaded under w’s window during OA . Since m ap-
proaches women according to his own order of preference, he would not
have serenaded under w’s window during OA without having serenaded
on the same night, or on a previous night, under w˜’s window. However,
since m is not matched with w˜ at the end of OA , then w˜ must have re-
jected him during OA and therefore, by definition, m ∈ R(w˜), and thus m
is a rejectee.
Lemma 3.10. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then she is not weakly better-off.
Proof. Since w is a rejecter, there exists r ∈ R(w) and by the definition of
R(w) there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ nw such that n
w
i = r. Since, by definition of R(w),
w rejected r during OA , and since, by induction and transitivity, w prefers
each member of O(w) over any man she rejected during OA , it follows
that she prefers owi over r = n
w
i , and is, thus, not weakly better-off.
Lemma 3.11. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then for each r ∈ R(w) there
exists a man B(w, r) such that
1. B(w, r) serenaded under w’s window during OA on the night on which she
rejected r, but B(w, r) was not rejected by her on that night.
2. B(w, r) prefers each member of N(B(w, r)) over w.
(If more than one such man exists, define B(w, r) to be one of these men, arbitrar-
ily.)
Proof. By Lemma 3.10, w is not a liar, and as such, her order of preference
during NA is her true order of preference. Let B be the set of all men
who serenaded under her window on the night during OA on which she
rejected r, but who were not rejected by her on that night. By definition
of the algorithm, w prefers each member of B over r, and |B| = nw. Since
w did not reject r during NA (since r ∈ N(w)), and since the order of
preference of w during NA is her true order of preference, then not all
member ofB serenaded under her window during NA (for she is matched
under NA to the set of the nw men that she prefers most out of all the men
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who serenaded under her window during NA ). Define, therefore, B(w, r)
to be a member of B who did not serenade under w’s window during NA
. Since B(w, r) did not serenade under w’s window during NA , and since
he approaches women according to his own order of preference, it follows
that he prefers each member of N(B(w, r)) over w.
Lemma 3.12. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then for each r ∈ R(w) there
exists a woman w˜ ∈ N(B(w, r)) such that
1. w˜ is a rejecter.
2. B(w, r) ∈ R(w˜)
3. During OA , w rejected r on a strictly later night than the night on which
w˜ rejected B(w, r).
Proof. Once again, throughout this proof, for the sake of conciseness, wher-
ever we discuss whether a rejection or serenading occurred, or when it
occurred, we always refer to OA . Since w is a rejecter, then by Lemma
3.11, B(w, r) serenaded under w’s window (on the night on which she re-
jected r) and B(w, r) prefers each member of N(B(w, r)) over w. Hence,
as B(w, r) approaches nB(w,r) women each night according to his own or-
der of preference, and as |N(B(w, r))| = nB(w,r), it follows that B(w, r)
serenaded on earlier nights under each of the windows of N(B(w, r)) and
was rejected by at least one of them on a night strictly earlier than any
night on which he serenaded under w’s window — let us denote such a
woman w˜. Since w˜ rejected B(w, r) (to whom she is matched under the
new matching), it follows that she is a rejecter and that B(w, r) ∈ R(w˜).
Moreover, since, by definition of B(w, r), w rejected r on a night on which
B(w, r) serenaded under her window as well, then this night is a strictly
later night than the night on which w˜ rejected B(w, r).
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.5, assume for contradiction that
there exists a man m1 ∈ M who has not gained only worse matches. By
Lemma 3.9, m1 is a rejectee, therefore there exists a rejecter w1 ∈ N(m1)
such thatm1 ∈ R(w1). Now, for each i ∈ N, assume by induction that wi is
a rejectee and that mi ∈ R(wi) and set, by Lemma 3.11, mi+1 = B(wi, mi).
By Lemma 3.12 , there exists a rejecter wi+1 ∈ N(mi+1). Moreover, by that
lemma, during OA , wi rejected mi on a night strictly later than the night
on which wi+1 rejected mi+1.
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From finiteness of W × M , there must exist i < j such that wi = wj
and mi = mj , but by induction, since i < j, then during OA , wi rejected
mi on a night strictly later than the night on which wj rejected mj — a
contradiction.
3.2 Blacklists and Mismatched Quotas
As mentioned before, in [1], it is not required that the sum of the quotas
of all colleges be the same as the number of applicants, resulting is some
colleges not fulfilling their quotas or some applicants not being accepted
to any college. Moreover, it is allowed for a college to remove some of the
students from its preference list, indicating that the college is unwilling
to accept these candidates even if it means that its quota will not be met.
Similarly, it is allowed for an applicant to remove some of the colleges
from their preference lists, indicating their unwillingness to attend these
colleges even at the risk of not being accepted to any college.
The modified algorithm-step for this scenario (in the notations used
throughout this document) is that if, by a certain night, the number of
women who have not blacklisted or (yet) rejected a man m ∈ M , and are
not blacklisted by him, is less than nm, then on that night he will serenade
under the windows of all these women. (Otherwise, if there are at least
nm such women, he will, as before, serenade under the windows of the nm
women that he prefers most out of them.)
Let us adjust our notations for this scenario, and then prove that the
result of this paper still holds under it:
Definition 3.13. A map between W and M, mapping each p ∈ W ∪ M to at
most np members of the set p does not belong to, is called a matching.
Definition 3.14. A matching is called unstable under the given orders of prefer-
ence if either the conditions of Definition 3.2 are met, or if there exists a matched
couple (w,m) and a woman (resp. man) p such that:
1. p is matched with less than np spouses.
2. p has not blacklistedm (resp. w).
3. m (resp. w) prefers p over w (resp.m).
Once again, a matching which is not unstable is called stable.
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For a person p ∈ P , let us denote O(p) and N(p) as before, and for each
1 ≤ i ≤ |O(p)| (resp. 1 ≤ i ≤ |N(p)|), let us denote opi (res. n
p
i ) as before as
well.
Definition 3.15. A woman w ∈ W is said to be weakly better-off if the following
conditions hold:
1. N(w) contains none of the men blacklisted by w.
2. |O(w)| ≤ |N(w)|
3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ O(w), w does not prefer owi over n
w
i .
If, in addition, either for some 1 ≤ i ≤ O(w), w prefers nwi over o
w
i (“w has
improved her matches”), or |O(w)| < |N(w)| (“w has gained matches”), then w
is said to be better-off.
The definition of a man having gained only worse matches remains
unchanged. Specifically, it should be emphasized that this definition does
not require that |N(m)| ≤ |O(m)|, but we will show in Corollary 3.17 that
under the above conditions the inverse is an impossibility. Similarly, the
same corollary will show that under the above conditions, a woman may
not be better-off due to gaining matches, but only due to improving them.
It should also be noted that, by the definition of the algorithm, it is not
possible for any person declaring their true preferences to be matched,
under the new matching, to any person blacklisted by them.
Corollary 3.16. Theorem 3.5 holds under the above conditions.
Proof. Corollary 3.16 can be proven by reducing to the conditions of The-
orem 3.5 by introducing, for each person p, np new monogamous people
of the opposite sex ∅p1, ..., ∅
p
np
, each of whom prefers p the most (the rest of
their orders of preference can be arbitrary). The original (resp. new) order
of preference for p will now be: first, all of the original people of the op-
posite sex who are not originally (resp. newly) blacklisted by p, ordered
according to her or his given original (resp. new) order of preference, then
∅p1, ..., ∅
p
np
in this order, and then, in an arbitrary order, the original (resp.
new) blacklist of p and the people newly-introduced for the other people
of the same sex as p. It is straight-forward to verify that the quotas of
all women (original and newly-introduced) match the quotas of all men
(original and newly-introduced). It is left for the reader to verify that the
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old (resp. new) matching before the reduction is identical to the old (resp.
new) matching under the reduction, after the newly-introduced people
have been removed from it, that each of the original women is weakly
better-off before the reduction iff she is weakly better-off under the reduc-
tion, and that if each of the original men has gained only worse matches
under the reduction, then he has also gained only worse matches before
the reduction.
Corollary 3.17. Under the conditions of Corollary 3.16, for each person p ∈
W ∪M , it holds that |N(p)| = |O(p)|.
Proof. Observe that for each person p ∈ W ∪ M , their old (resp. new)
matches under the reduction are their old (resp. new) matches before the
reduction, “padded” by asmany people as needed from the top of ∅p1, ..., ∅
p
np
to fulfill their quota of np matches. Assume, for contradiction, that there
exists a man m ∈ M such that (before the reduction) |N(m)| > |O(m)|.
Let o = |O(m)| (before the reduction), then under the reduction, m is
matched with ∅pnp−o under the original matching, but not under the new
matching. Recall that ∅np−o prefers p the most, so she is not weakly better-
off — a contradiction. We have thus shown that for each man m ∈ M ,
|N(m)| ≤ |O(m)|, and since all women are weakly better-off, then for each
woman w ∈ W , |N(w)| ≥ |O(w)|, thus we have
∑
w∈W
N(w) ≥
∑
w∈W
O(w) =
∑
m∈M
O(m) ≥
∑
m∈M
N(m) =
∑
w∈W
N(w)
which yields that all members of this inequality are actually equal. Since
for every woman w ∈ W , |N(w)| ≥ |O(w)|, (res. for every man m ∈ M ,
|N(m)| ≤ |O(m)|,) and since summing over all women (resp. all men) we
get an equality, it follows that the equality holds for each woman (resp.
each man) separately.
It should be noted that in [5], Corollary 3.17 is proved using an entirely
different approach for the special case of the monogamous scenario where
the new match is stable, and in [6], it is proved also for the polygamous
scenario where the new match is stable. Corollary 3.17 generalizes these
results, as it does not require stability of the new match.
Corollary 3.18. Under the conditions of Theorem 2.2, if |L| = 1 and the lying
woman is better-off, then so is some innocent woman too.
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Proof. Since the liar is better-off, then she is newlymatchedwith someman
to whom shewas not originally matched, and since the number of matches
for this man remained the same, then he is no longer matched with some
woman to whom he was originally matched, and hence the set of matches
for that woman has changed, and thus, since she is weakly better-off, she
is better-off.
4 Summary and Open Problems
We have shown throughout this paper that even in very general scenarios,
a form of sisterhood exists in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm, both
in terms of not harming each other, and in terms of not helping any man.
If one were to define the concepts of “weakly worse-off” and “having
gained only better matches” along the lines of definitions 3.3 and 3.4, then
one would find that gaining only worse matches is stronger than (i.e. a
special case of) being weakly worse-off and gaining only better matches
is stronger case of being better-off. Thus, it follows that in the scenarios
discussed in this paper, in a sense, the minimum possible damage to a
man is greater than the minimum possible gain for a woman.
It is interesting to check whether, under various conditions, the overall
damage to men is, in any sense, usually greater that the overall gain for
women (and thus resulting in damage to the entire population as a whole,
which contrasts the sisterhood which exists amongst the women).
The example given in this paper (and other examples given in the first
author’s undergraduate thesis, upon which this paper is based) had to be
crafted very delicately. It is interesting to check whether, when the or-
ders of preference are determined by a random model, lies can be very
beneficial (either for the lying women, and for their innocent colleagues),
or whether the utility gained from such a lie is usually relatively small.
Furthermore, in many of these examples, and in many examples speci-
fied in the literature, the preferences of every person differ greatly from
those of each of their colleagues. In the real-world scenario of colleges
and applicants, however, it is reasonable to expect the preferences of most
applicants to be similar, and the same applies to the preferences of most
colleges. There will always be differences, but it seems that they are likely
to be local, such as a permutation on colleges which follow each other in
the order of preference. It seems unlikely, for example, for a certain col-
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lege to be highly rated by half of the applicants and poorly raged by the
rest. (All this applies to the preferences of colleges as well, naturally.) It
is interesting to try and build a probabilistic model along these lines, that
matches the observed behaviors by medical interns and colleges through-
out the years, and to check the questions raised above under such a model.
In addition, since in the real world the knowledge of each player is not full,
it can be interesting to check whether, given only knowledge of a statisti-
cal model for the preferences of the rest of the players (and possibly full
knowledge of the preferences of just a few players), there exist strategies
(for individual players, or for small sets of players) which are expected to
be better for these players than telling the truth. It can also be interesting
to check what happens if such strategies are simultaneously applied by
more than one conspiring set of players.
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